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˘Turkey and the European Union
Turkey has enjoyed challenging and intricate relations with the European Union (EU) for over half a century. Offi cial ties began in 1963 when Turkey and the then-European 
Economic Community concluded an Association Agreement that ushered in freer trade and 
closer political cooperation. Bilateral ties leapt forward with the establishment of a customs 
union in 1996. Nineteen years later, the EU launched accession negotiations with Turkey in 
October 2005.
Ever since the EU promised Turkey prospects of accession in 1963, the EU became synonymous with 
Turkey’s westernisation. Europe was hesitant and tentative toward Turkish entreaties from the start. 
A turnaround of sorts took place under the leadership of German Chancellor Gerhard Shroeder and 
Foreign Minister Joshka Fischer. Their backing was crucial to initiating the negotiating process.
However, the replacement of Shroeder by Angela Merkel helped reduce accession to a snail’s pace. 
Germany and France never cease to frustrate the ambitions of this Muslim-majority country. Jean-David 
Levitte, foreign policy advisor to French President Sarkozy admitted so much according to a Wikileaks 
cable, in which he confi rmed that Paris wants Turks to realise that ‘their role is best played as a bridge 
between the two worlds of Europe and Asia, rather than anchored in Europe itself.’
Turkey has commenced negotiations on thirteen of the 33 ‘chapters’ or policy areas that it needs 
to adopt ahead of accession. Of these 33 chapters, only one is closed, seventeen are blocked and a 
mere three chapters are eligible for opening. In response to Turkey’s refusal to grant port access to 
Greek Cypriot vessels and planes, the EU has suspended eight chapters. More broadly, the lack of 
tangible progress in the ongoing Cyprus reunifi cation talks means that accession is heading to an 
assured stalemate, if not breakdown.
Turkey shares equal blame with Europe for the rapid deterioration of bilateral relations, since Turkey’s 
reform agenda ground to a near halt once the EU agreed to accession negotiations, and Turkish 
enthusiasm abruptly dissipated. Accession was thereafter used tactically in power plays between 
the government and its domestic opponents. Turkey, in essence, was not fully committed to Europe.
EUROPEAN SCEPTICISM OF TURKEY
Hrant Dink, an internationally-renowned Turkish-Armenian intellectual murdered in 2006, noted 
astutely that Turkey and Europe are bound by fear rather than solidarity. Both parties are pushed by 
geographical realities to deal tepidly with each other, not out of a desire for intimate neighbourly 
relations. Sandwiched between Europe and Asia, Turkey can ill-afford to totally ignore Europe and 
vice versa. 
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Turkey is quite unpopular among Europeans. In a 
2006 survey by US-based ‘Transatlantic Trends’ in 9 
EU countries, respondents disliked Turkey more than 
Israel, China and Russia and slightly less than Palestine 
and Iran. Turkey’s image is similarly problematic. 
Simon Anholt, an independent government advisor, 
regularly conducts surveys of ‘nation brands’. He asks 
people in 50 countries on what they think of other 
nations in terms of their exports, people, government, 
culture and so on. Turkey tends to fare poorly, ranked 
36 in the 2008 index behind Russia and Egypt.
Turkey’s Muslim identity lies at the heart of European 
hostility. In a 2009 Bosporus University opinion poll 
conducted in France, Germany, Poland, Spain and 
the United Kingdom, 39% of respondents agreed 
that Turkey is ‘a Muslim country [...] incompatible 
with the common Christian roots’ of Europe. Only 
20% of respondents cited culture and religion as a 
prerequisite for EU accession when Turkey’s name 
was omitted. 
Cultural differences are also intensifying European 
doubts of Turkey’s democratic credentials. TEPAV, a 
Turkish think-tank, found in a 2007 poll that around 
50% of Europeans prioritised liberties and democracy 
as conditions for further enlargement. Mentioning 
Turkey’s name raised that level to 85%.
EU leaders and their publics seem convinced that 
Turkey’s Islamic background is incompatible with 
European norms. Just 31% of Europeans and 62% 
of political elites accept that Europe and Turkey share 
common values, a 2011 Transatlantic Trends survey 
reveals. It also found that a mere 21% and 51% 
respectively are enthusiastic about Turkey joining 
the EU.
Jeffrey C. Dixon, a sociologist, attributes the strength 
of opposition to the perceived threat that Turkey poses 
to the group position and identity of ‘Europeans’. 
Turkey’s identity is seen by a wide cross-section 
of European populations as apposite to secular 
lifestyles and attitudes. Germans, Austrians and the 
French are loathe to see more Turks living in their 
neighbourhoods. Not even robust EU guarantees to 
permanently restrict Turkish migration was enough 
to assuage concerns. 
In turn, Turkish Prime Recep Tayyip Erdogan ratchets 
up anxieties with muscular criticisms of German 
policies to integrate its large Turkish community. 
He told a German newspaper that those policies 
failed to consider the needs and expectations of this 
community. Addressing the government’s campaign 
to encourage more Turks to speak German, he added: 
‘Any policy which seeks to revoke the language and 
culture of migrants violates international law.’ These 
kind of comments reinforce European perceptions 
that Turks are culturally distinct.
TURKISH SCEPTICISM OF EUROPE
Naturally, the faltering EU process is coinciding with 
growing Turkish antipathy for accession. Popular 
support stands at only 40% compared to a high 
of 75% six years ago. Turkey’s rambunctious prime 
minister criticises the EU’s lukewarm attitude to 
Turkey’s accession with increasing frequency. He 
recently thundered that Turkey is ‘no more a country 
that would wait at the EU’s doors like a docile 
supplicant.’ 
Not only is the political chasm widening, but the 
same seems to be happening culturally. Turks are 
increasingly focussing on the alleged cultural divide 
between Turkey and Europe. In particular, they feel 
that Europe rejects Turkey on the basis of religion. 
Undoubtedly, this an inevitable consequence of the 
slowdown of Turkey’s journey to Europe .
TURKEY LOOKING EAST
Domestically, the EU barely registers in political and 
intellectual debates, and Turkish politicians pay 
lip service to the accession issue at best. Far more 
attention is devoted to rebuilding Turkey’s diplomatic 
and economic outreach to the Middle East and North 
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Africa, and Eurasia. Europe no longer assumes a pride 
of place in Turkey’s foreign policy calculations. Gone 
are the days when Turkey subordinated its national 
interest to Western strategic considerations. 
Nowadays, the decline of accession is accelerating a 
more independent, less pro-European Turkish foreign 
policy. Turkey is fostering closer ties with Iran, the 
Arab world and Russia This particular evident in 
economic and trade relations. While Turkey’s trade 
volume with Europe remains static at at around 45% 
of its overall trade, the share with the Middle East is 
climbing fast from a very low base to around 20%. 
Turkey is lifting visa restrictions on neighbouring 
countries. Europe, in contrast, refuses steadfastly to 
engage in ‘visa diplomacy’ with Turkey. 
Policy independence, as opposed to interdependence, 
will increasingly defi ne the nature of EU-Turkey 
relations. Thus far, Turkey’s dealings with the EU 
have been mostly multi-lateral, a natural outcome 
of the accession negotiations. Driven by prospects 
of accession, Turkey has contributed peace-keeping 
forces to EU operations in the Ivory Coast and the 
Balkans, and supported at least 90% of EU’s foreign 
policy positions. Cooperation will be patchier, ad hoc 
and less systematic in the future as Turkey’s multiplicity 
of interests with the neighbouring Middle East and 
Eurasia may collide with European strategic concerns.
Three recent cases illustrate the mutual divergences 
vividly. First among them is the rift on Iranian nuclear 
ambitions. Turkey opposes the EU line of tough 
economic sanctions on Tehran. Instead, Ankara 
has argued vigorously for intensifi ed diplomatic 
engagement with Tehran. Turkey surprised European 
partners by voting against the last round of sanctions 
at the UN Security Council. In addition, Turkey 
partnered with Brazil to secure Iran’s agreement to 
swap 1,200 kilogrammes of low-enriched uranium 
for fuel rods on Turkish soil. Europe was prompt in 
dismissing this deal as too little, too late.
Energy security is another arena for dampening 
aspirations. Turkey and the EU have trumpeted the 
advantages of the Nabucco pipeline to diversify 
energy supplies away from Russia. If built, it would 
transport 31 billion metres of natural gas from the 
Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia to European 
consumers. Yet, the weak accession process has 
diluted interest for Nabucco and other ambitious 
joint projects.
Most illustrative is the lack of effective cooperation 
between NATO and the EU. Turkey (in NATO but not 
the EU) objects to Cypriot (in the EU but not in NATO) 
participation in EU-NATO meetings. In retaliation, 
Cyprus veteos tighter defence cooperation between 
the EU and Turkey. In addition, Turkey does not 
facilitate European access to NATO military assets 
for peace-keeping operations unless obstacles to 
the accession process are neutralised. As insecurity 
spreads across Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the 
regional order implodes in the Middle East and 
North Africa, the persistence of EU-NATO acrimony 
is untimely and indefensible. 
A LOST OPPORTUNITY 
Proponents of Turkish accession have long argued 
that a secular European Turkey would magnify 
European infl uence in the Middle East. In a region 
bereft of democratic governance, Europe lost the 
opportunity to showcase the compatibility of secular 
democracy and Islam. According to a 2010 TESEV 
poll, Turkey enjoys an overall favourabililty rating 
of 75% in the Middle East. A similar percentage of 
Arabs endorsed Turkey’s quest to join the EU as a 
shining example to the region.
Stressing the tangible fears of Turkish accession has 
sidelined the intangible benefi ts. Proper assessments 
of Turkey’s place in Europe have fallen by the wayside. 
Europe has relied on bankrolling singular leaderships 
in the Arab world. Only a few lonely European voices 
forewarned that Turkey will be a key ally to infl uence 
events in its immediate neighbourhood. Now the 
futility and short-sightedness of that policy has been 
laid bare by the unexpected challenges to traditional 
Arab regimes.
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Fortress Europe, however fortifi ed the walls may be, 
will fi nd it more diffi cult to combat its impending 
challenges without Turkey. Whether it is illegal 
migration or insecure energy sources, Turkey’s 
contribution is incalculable. After all, Turkey is a key 
transit point for illegal migration and is proximate to 
three-quarters of global energy resources. As has been 
starkly demonstrated in recent months, Europe cannot 
take for granted the permanence of Arab leaderships. 
Arab public opinion, once safely ignored, is certain to 
play a bigger role in the developing contours of the 
new Middle East as more representative governments 
replace singular leaderships in the region. European 
attempts to impact regional changes without Turkey 
at the core will be more complicated. 
THE FUTURE OF EU-TURKEY RELATIONS 
Turkey’s historical dream of EU membership looks 
at present a remote possibility. In light of the 
non-accession process, the mutual relationship 
is comatose. Neither side wants to terminate the 
accession drive nor galvanise progress. Both are 
satisfi ed with the current state of deep freeze. Prime 
Minister Erdogan is content to harangue the EU as a 
‘Christian club’ for domestic consumption. Europe, 
on the other hand, procrastinates. To rephrase an old 
Russian proverb, Turkey pretends to desire accession, 
Europe pretends to want Turkish entry. Commitment 
is seriously lacking.
Meanwhile, the EU-Turkey relationship is losing 
momentum in the midst of global paradigm shifts 
and uncertainty sweeping the Middle East and North 
Africa. Unfortunately, the real prize of accession 
was missed: embracing a Muslim-majority society 
into the European fold. Such a development could 
have led to a prosperous, secular and democratic 
Turkey anchored in European norms. Instead, cultural 
differences are thriving. 
Europe is rapidly losing weight in the international 
arena. Its response to the fi nancial crisis, the emerging 
multi-polar world, new security challenges, questions 
of European identity and human rights has come 
under scrutiny. Europe is not seen as taking the lead 
in handling the evolving situation on its southern 
shores; the US is. Europe did not coordinate actions 
with Turkey; the US had to step in.
Recent events indicate that bilateral relations will be 
lukewarm. Turkey may wish to renegotiate the terms 
of the partnership at some point, such as reducing the 
EU-Turkey customs union to a free trade area. It will 
be less tempted to be show fl exibility on the Cyprus 
confl ict and territorial disputes with Greece. Turkey 
will probably interact with individual EU countries 
rather than multilaterally. 
Eventually, however, the EU and Turkey will be forced 
into a new modus operandi beyond accession. Too 
many common interests will prevent a complete 
severance or rupture. They cannot defy the dictates 
of geography nor afford a collapse in relations. 
After all, several million Turks live in Europe; half of 
Turkey’s trade is with the EU. Sadly, the lowest level 
of cooperation will be the outcome, a far cry from 
the exciting vision of a Turkey rooted in Europe. ■
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